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In this paper I show that (1) company effects as well as industry effects
explain a substantial proportion of the variance in R&D intensity, (2)
the apparent impact of seller concentration is collinear with, and
apparently a result of differences in, types of products, and (3) govern-
mentsubsidization ofR&D does notdisplace privateR&D spending.
10.1 The Inverted-U in Theory
Empirical studies of nonprice competition have hypothesized and
found an "inverted-V" relation between media advertising or com-
pany-financed R&D and seller concentration. These studies include
Greer (1971), Strickland and Weiss (1976), Scott (1978), Martin (1979),
andScherer(1967; 1980a, p. 437), as well as otherscitedbythese authors.
There is nonetheless good reason to question the cause ofthe relation in
conventional cross-sectional studies where firms operating in many dif-
ferent industries contribute to the variance in nonprice competition. The
relation could be-explained by variance across industries in (1) the value
or cost of nonprice competition, (2) the opportunity (the odds for suc-
cess) for it, (3) the condition of entry, or (4) the ability to "collude"
(tacitlyorotherwise) onnonprice competitionwhile holding constantthe
ability to "collude" on price competition (Scott 1981b).
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Thispaperpresentsevidenceaboutthecauseoftheinverted-V relation
between seller concentration and nonprice competition. If observed in-
verted-V's result for reasons (1) or (2) only, then they do not imply
collusion and, therefore, do not imply concern with "wasteful competi-
tion." The variance in nonprice competition across firms and industries
may have nothingto do with the conjecturalinterdependence andmutual
dependence recognized among sellers, but instead may reflect differing
prospective rewards toR&D oradvertising in the absenceofconjectural
interdependence. The observations studied here are for the 3388 manu-
facturing lines of business of the 437 firms reporting for 1974 to the
Federal Trade Commission's Line of Business (LB) program.! The re-
sults are that a statistically significant inverted-V relation exists for these
observations if one does not attempt to control for differences across
firms and industries in the value, costs, and "opportunity for" nonprice
competition apart from that correlated with concentration, but once
controls are added in the form of a fixed-effects model the relation
disappears. The fixed-effects model may not, ofcourse, be the appropri-
ate way to control for the varying economic potential for nonprice com-
petition. As discussed later, onecannotunambiguouslyconclude thatthe
"collusion" hypothesis is rejected. But despite considerable variation in
concentration within two-digit industries, it apparently has no impact on
behavior within them.
10.2 The Inverted-U in Fact
Table 10.1 shows that the inverted-V relation between company-
financed R&D intensity and seller concentration is statistically signifi-
cant in the LB sample. Table 10.2 controls for company and two-digit
industryeffects as well as Weiss's (1980) adjustedfour-firm sellerconcen-
tration ratio at the four-digit FTC industry level and its square. The
inverted-V relation does not remain once differences in value, costs, and
opportunity for nonprice competition are controlled for with a
fixed-effects model.
Apparently, the inverted-V results because firms face different oppor-
tunities apart from those inherent in concentration and because, for
example, breakfast cereals and cold-rolled steel and chemicals are very
different products for which the value of innovative investment differs
even without consideration of the extent of sellers' interdependence. I
believe my interpretation is valid even though the two-digit industry
dummies will capture the variance in concentration to the extent that
1. See u.S. FederalTrade Commission (1979,1981) for a description ofthe program. I
also present the R&D model for the 3550 manufacturing lines ofbusiness ofthe 474 firms
reporting for 1975 in 260 FTC four-digit manufacturing categories. Scott (1981a) presents
evidence for advertising intensity analogous to that presented here for R&D intensity.235 Firm versus Industry Variability in R&D Intensity
Table 10.1 The Inverted-U for 1974: 3388 Manufacturing LB'sa
Company-financed R&D Intensity: (R/S) for an LB (the operations of a firm in a FTC
four-digit manufacturingindustry) as a function offour-firm sellerconcentration(C4) in the
four-digit FTC industry.
R/S = .00094 + .00049(C4) - .0000038(C4)2.
(.43) (4.5)b (-3.1)b
Since one extraordinaryoutlierwas excluded from the sample, degrees offreedom = 3384;
F-value for significance ofthe equation as a whole = 25, significant at the .0001 level; R
2 =
.015. R/S reaches its predicted maximum when C4 = 64.
aThe intensity variables are ratios with LB sales as the denominator. I scale by LB sales to
control for types ofcompany-specific effects that are correlated with the firm's LB sales in
the manufacturing category. C4 is Weiss's (1980) adjusted ratio in percentage form. The
t-ratios are in parentheses below the coefficients.
bSignificance level (two-tailed test): b = .01.
Table 10.2 Controlling for Company and Industry Effects: 3388 Manufacturing
LB's, 437 Companies, 20 FTC Two-Digit Industriesa
Company-financed R&D Intensity: (R/S) for an LB (the operations of a firm in a FTC
four-digit manufacturingindustry) as a function offour-firm sellerconcentration (C4) in the
FTC four-digit industry.
436 19
R/S = bo+ ! be + ! bi +j(C4) + g(C4)2.
e=l i=l
.02 .06
F-value for null hypothesisofno effectin completemodel given below the coefficients. Here
and throughout the paper, whenever coefficients are shown as letters, it is because the
statistical package used provided only the F-values for the effects. Since one extraordinary
outlier was excluded from the sample, degrees offreedom = 2929; F-value for significance
of the equation as a whole = 3.8, significant at the .0001 level; R 2 = .37.
aSee note a oftable 10.1. Also note that to reduce the size ofthe X'X matrix for computa-
tional purposes, the company effects were absorbed. Hence, the F-test for theirsignificance
in the complete model is not computed. It is computed later for the "best" model.
bSignificance level: b = .0001.
CF-test for the significance of the company effects alone-given only the intercept-not
controlling for the other variables. That is, the reduction in the sum ofsquares because of
the company effects is what results when they are fitted first, not last. See note a.
concentrationis homogeneouswithin two-digitindustries. Inthe extreme
case, one could not control at the two-digit level for different types of
goods, sayfood in general versus chemicals in general, andsellerconcen-
tration at the four-digit level. In fact, such control is possible. In general,
for the 259 four-digit FTC industries, 74 percent of the variance in
concentration is within two-digit industries. In the specific 3388 observa-
tion sample, 68 percent of the variance in concentration is within two-
digit industries.236 John T. Scott
Theinference that collusion does not cause observedinverted-V'smay
well beinappropriatefor two reasons. First, industrysellerconcentration
alone may not be the appropriate control for mutual dependence recog-
nized. Market power may have more to do with firm share, given that
seller concentration is sufficiently great for recognized mutual depen-
dence. Long (1981) is currently exploring the implications ofsuch Cowl-
ing-Waterson (1976) conjecturalinterdependenceequilibriafor nonprice
competition. In any case, the results here at least imply that traditional
interpretations ofthe collusion hypothesis do not hold up once the fixed
effects are used as controls.
Thesecondreasonfor cautiousinterpretationoftheresults is thatfixed
effects may simply not be the appropriate way of controlling for the
differentiability of products, the potential for R&D, the need for in-
formative advertising, and so forth. True, the fixed-effects models ex-
plain more variance than the simple structural models. Table 10.3 shows
the pure fixed-effects model unalloyed with the structural variables.
2 But
these fixed-effects models have many times the number of regressors as
the simpler models. In terms ofa probability-of-F-test comparison ofthe
models, structural models look quite good. Further, and related to the
first concern, the company effects may well be picking up firm-specific
aspects of market power.
As noted above, even the significance of firm-specific effects and the
insignificance of seller concentration need not imply that industrywide
recognition of mutual interdependence is absent. Cowling-Waterson
(1976) conjectural interdependence equilibria can imply company-
specific differences in R&D intensity caused by "collusion" within
industries. Table 10.4 explores that possibility and, perhaps more impor-
tantly, provides descriptive information about "part-of-company" effects
and narrow-industry effects within broad industry categories by estimat-
ing the fixed-effects model for each two-digit FTC industry. The twenty
models for R&D intensity provide strong supportfor the importance of
company effects within industries. Ofthe twenty models for R&D, the
company effects are significant at the .05 level for nine cases rather than
the one "expected."
In conclusion, the evidence from the fixed-effects models suggests
caution when interpreting cross-sectional, multi-industry, inverted-V re-
lations between seller concentration and nonprice competition. This is
not to say that with intricate interactive simultaneous-equations model-
ing of various factors other than firm effects, opportunity classes at the
2. I tested the sensitivity of the results to the inclusion or exclusion of the observations
for whichR&Dis zero. The models in table 10.3 were rerun, dropping all observationsfor
whichR&D was zero from theR&D model. The results were virtually the same as those
in table 10.3.237 Firm versus Industry Variability in R&D Intensity
Table 10.3 Pure Company and Industry Effects Model: 3388 Manufacturing
LB's, 437 Companies, 259 FTC Four-Digit Manufacturing




F-value for null hypothesis of
no effect in the complete model
436 company dummies
258 FTC four-digit industry dummies
19 FTC two-digit industry dummies
Degrees of freedom
















aSee note a of table 10.2.
bSignificance level: b = .0001.
CF-test for significance ofcompany effects alone-given only the intercept-notcontrolling
for industryeffects. Thatis, the reductionin thesumofsquaresdue to thecompanyeffects is
what results when they are fitted first, not last. See note a of table 10.2.
dThis result is for the 3550 manufacturing LB's of the 474 firms reporting in 260 FTC
four-digit manufacturing industries in 1975. Thus, there were 473 company dummies and
259 FTCfour-digit industry dummies. The 1975 observations were used because there were
no extraordinaryoutliersin 1975, andthus, thevalidityofthe 1974 resultscouldbechecked.
eSince one extraordinary outlier was dropped, only 3387 LB's were used.
fThe explanatory power (but see note c) was divided as follows: For R/S 32.1 percent from
company effects, 16.4percentfrom industry effects. Inspection oftable 10.5 shows thatone
can get roughly the32 percentwith eitherthecompanyeffectsortheindustryeffects andget
the remaining 16 percentwith whichever is left. One could say then that about 16 percentis
clearly from companyeffects, about 16 percentis clearlyfrom industryeffects, and about 16
percent is confounded in the two types ofeffects. Note that, as shown below, the company
effects are significant in the complete model.
broad industry level, and concentration, or simply more control vari-
ables, thatthe positive correlation orthe inverted-Uwould not be found.
Rather, since we find a strong inverted-U in the data without control for
variance in opportunity across observations, but eliminate that relation
oncethe opportunitycontrols are added, there is thepresumptionthatall
such previously adduced correlations may be artifacts of insufficient
control for opportunity. On the positive score, the results suggest that
company-specific and FTC industry-specific effects can explain a large
amount of the variance in nonprice competition. Clearly, the evidence
suggests that company policy may influence the technological progress of
theeconomy. OnecannotexplainR&D activity simplyby observingthe
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.241 Firm versus Industry Variability in R&D Intensity
10.3 Government R&D Financing on Company R&D Expenditures
Several studies have suggested low private returns to government-
financed R&D. Scherer (1980b, pp. 19-20,26-27,29; 1981, pp. 16-17)
finds that patent output per dollar of private R&D spending is signifi-
cantly lower when government financing of R&D is high. Griliches
(1980, pp. 439,445-46) and Terleckyj (1974; 1980, p. 362,367) find that
the rate ofreturn to government-financedR&D appears far lower than
that for company R&D.
Griliches (1980, pp. 445-46, and note 14) and Scherer (1980b, p. 20)
explain that such results may be because ofexternalities and restrictions
on the appropriability ofinnovations. Levy and Terleckyj (1981) suggest
further that government-financedR&D may have an indirect influence
on productivity by increasing the amount ofprivateR&D above what it
would be in the absence of government funding.
Here I present a simple test ofthe extent to which governmentR&D
spending is a substitute for, and therefore displaces, or is a complement
to, and therefore increases, company-financed R&D spending. Al-
though the methodology is different, the question is the same as one of
Mansfield's (this volume). The test uses the 3388 observations on lines of
business for the 437 companies reporting in 259 FTCfour-digit manufac-
turing categories in 1974 to the FTC's Line of Business (LB) program.
The company and industry fixed-effects model for these datadiscussed in
section 10.2 shows that, with 1975 data, 49 percent ofthe variance in the
ratio of company-financed R&D to LB sales is explained by the com-
pany and industry effects. Here, the 1974 data are used and one addi-
tional explanatory variable is added-the ratio of government-financed
R&D to LB sales. The question is, other things equal: Is com-
pany-financed R&D intensity greater or lower in LB's where govern-
ment-financed R&D is greater?
Table 10.5 provides the answer, although it is certainly possible to
question causal stories since random disturbances in company- and gov-
ernment-financed R&D might reasonably be correlated. Equation (1)
shows thatgovernmentfinancing goes to firms that do a lotofR&D in a
LB. Equation (2) shows that the relation is not simply the result offunds
going to firms that characteristically do a lot of R&D. Equation (3)
shows that we are not simply observing that funds go to firms in R & D-
intensive industries. Equation (4) shows thattherelation is notsimplythe
result of government funds going to R&D intensive firms in R&D
intensive industries. The substitution hypothesis is rejected. There
appears to be stimulation rather than substitution.
There is, however, the possibility of spurious results in table 10.5's
specifications because sales appear in the denominator on both sides of
the equation (see Kuh and Meyer 1955). Table 10.6 presents results that
show that the positive relation, otherthings equal, between government-242 John T. Scott
Table 10.5
(1)
Company R&D Intensity (R/S) and Government-Financed R&D
Intensity (GIS) for an LB
3
RIS = .013 + .10 (GIS).
(29)b (9.9)b
The t-ratios are in parentheses below the coefficients. Degrees offreedom = 3385; F-value
for significance of the equation = 98b; R2 = .028.
(2)
436
RIS = bo+ I be + .076 (GIS).
e=l
(3.6)b,e (58)b
The F-values arein parenthesesbelow the coefficients. Degreesoffreedom = 2949; F-value




RIS = bo+ I bi + .091 (GIS).
i=l
(6.0)b,e (62)b
TheF-values are in parenthesesbelow the coefficients. Degreesoffreedom = 3127; F-value




RIS = bo+ I be + I bi + bg(GIS).
e=l i=l
(4.4)b,e (3.6)b (40)b
TheF-values arein parenthesesbelow the coefficients. Degreesoffreedom = 2691; F-value
for significance of the equation = 4.2b; R
2 = .52.
3A line ofbusiness (LB) is the operations ofa company in a FTC four-digit manufacturing
industry. Theintensityvariablesare ratioswith LBsales as the denominator. I scale by sales
tocontrolfor types ofcompany-specificeffects that are correlatedwith the firm's LB sales in
the manufacturing category. One extraordinaryoutlierwas excludedfrom the sample; thus
3387 LB observations were used.
bSignificance level is .0001.
eTo reduce the size of the X'X matrix for computational purposes, these effects were
absorbed. Hence the F-test for their significance in the complete model is not computed.
That is, the reduction in sum of squares due to these effects is what results when they are
fitted first, not last. The Ftest for the significance of the company effects in the complete
model is computed later for the "best" model.
financed R&D and company-financed R&D is not spurious. The
relation is, however, far less significant in the specifications used in table
10.6, suggesting that variance in the denominators of the intensity vari-
ables did affect the high level of significance for the intensity of govern-
ment-financed R&D.
In table 10.6, all LB observations for which company-financedR&D
was zero were dropped. We are, after all, interested in whether com-
panies that do private R&D do more when government financing is
present. The following variables are used:
LR == the natural logarithm (In) of company-financed R&D (R) in
the line of business (LB);
LS == In of LB sales (S);243 Firm versus Industry Variability in R&D Intensity
Table 10.6 Regressions with LR as the Dependent Variable
Independent Equation Equation Equation Equation
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Intercept -3.5 bo bo bo
(t = - 9.6)a
LS .91 .88 .99 F= 1709a
(t = 40)a (t = 41)a (t = 43)a
LG .081 .075 .060 F= 2.9c
(t = 2.3)b (t = 2.3)b (t = 1.6)C
X -.49 -.20 - .10 F= .15
(t = -1.8)C (t = - .78) (t= -.41)
Company effects F= 7.7a,d F= 10a,d
394 effects 394 effects
Industry effects F = 8.5a,d F= 3.5a
254 effects 253 effects
e
Degrees of freedom 2476 2082 2222 1829
R
2 .44 .70 .66 .80
F-value for equation 655a 12a 17a 11a
a,b,CSignificance levels: a = .0001; b = .05; C = .10.
dSee note c, table 10.5.
eAn additional industry dummy had to be dropped. See note c, table 10.4A.
LG == In ofgovernment-financedR&D (G) if G > 0, In(l) if G == 0;
X == 0, if G > 0, 1 if G == 0; and various fixed effects.
The difference in significance in tables 10.5 and 10.6for the government-
financed R&D variable is a result ofthe new functional form and not a
result of dropping the zero R&D observations, since the specifications
in table 10.5 yield similar results with and without the zero observations.
ItmustbenotedthatI have said nothingmorethanwhatis apparent. In
particular, I have said nothing about productivity. It is entirely possible
that government subsidies stimulate "wasteful" private spending.
Nonetheless, the results suggest some complementarity between private
and government-financed R&D and are remarkably similar to the re-
sults in Mansfield (this volume).3Anincidentalfinding in table 10.6is that
there is no evidence that company-financed R&D increases more than
proportionately with LB size.
One more fact provides a useful conclusion. Although my primary
interest is in whether an impact for seller concentration or government-
financed R&D remains after controlling for company effects (either
idiosyncraticreportingorrealR&D activity) andindustryeffects, many
3. WhenR = G so thatslope and elasticity are thesame, my results in table 10.6arevery
close to Mansfield's result. Holding constant S and therefore using the estimate of
d(RIS) /d(GIS) toestimatedR/dG, my results in table 10.5 are also quiteclose to Mansfield's
results, although somewhat larger.244 John T. Scott
readers may want to see the F-test in the complete model for company
effects. I have therefore computed one such test (forwhat seems to me to
be the "best" model). All such tests would be similar, so there is no need
to do them all.
Using sums ofsquares from equations (3) and (4) from table 10.6, the
test ofthe hypothesis that in the complete modelbe = 0for all 394 effects
is given by:
[
reduction in residual sum of squares from fitting the]
F = 394 effects after fitting the other variables/394
[the residual sum of squares for the complete model/1829]
= 3.3 with 394 and 1829 degrees of freedom,
highly significant by classical standards.
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Comment Albert N. Link
Professor Scott presents the results from two interesting, and compe-
tently done, empiricalexperiments. Using the FTC'sline ofbusiness data
for the domestic manufacturing sector, he examined the separate rela-
tionships between company-financed applied research and development
(AR & D) expenditures per unit of sales and both seller concentration
and government-financed AR & D expenditures per unit of sales. This
study is useful because it illustrates some fundamental R&D-related
relationships that have previously been clouded by the inability of re-
searchers to disaggregate by line of business.
Company AR & D Expenditures and Concentration
Thefirst ofProfessorScott'stwo analyses is motivatedby the economic
literature on nonprice competition: nonprice competition, it is hypothe-
sized, will increase with seller concentration to a point, and then will
Albert N. Link is professorofeconomics and department headin the School ofBusiness
and Economics, University of North Carolina at Greensboro.246 John T. Scott
decline as a result of collusive-like activities that hamper all forms of
rivalry. He illustrates in tables 10.1 and 10.2 that the line of business
AR & D per unit of sales to concentration relationship exhibits an in-
verted-V; however, once differences in value, costs, and opportunities
for nonprice competition are controlled for this relationship is no longer
significant.
I have two comments onthis section ofthe paper. The first is a general
comment on the use of line of business AR & D data for measuring
nonprice competition, and the second is a specific comment on the
particular specification used in the estimation.
Professor Scott's argument for examining nonprice competition at the
line ofbusiness level is quite valid, I think. There is no a priori reason to
believe that firms' nonprice competition is homogeneous across industry
bounds. But when AR & D is the form ofnonprice competition, several
conceptualquestions arise thatshouldbeconsidered. Thefirst relates to a
characteristic ofAR & D. AR & D often leads to a secondary product,
knowledge. If, for example, AR & D expenditures are process related
and are allocated in one line of business, might the knowledge obtained
from implementing the associated technology be adaptable to a second
line of business? If the answer is yes, and I think it is, then the ratio of
AR & D to sales in the second line of business may understate the
relevant degree oftechnology-related competition. The second question
relates to the source oftechnology. Companies can invest in technology-
related nonprice competition in at least two ways: they can induce the
technology through their own AR & D activities, or they can purchase
the technology in the form of new or improved capital equipment. As I
have shown (Link, Tassey and Zmud 1983), this decision to induce or
purchase (make versus buy) is related, in part, to the stage of the
industry's product life cycle. Consequently, if at a given time industries
(lines of business) with the same degree of seller concentration are at
different stages in their life cycles, then a comparison of just AR & D
expenditures may be misleading.
Finally, I have a general comment about the line of business file. I
realize that at the time ofProfessor Scott's study data were available for
only one year. Consequently, his cross-sectional analysis assumes that
AR & D expenditurescan accuratelyreflect interlinebusiness difference
across firms in AR & D effort. Economists using cross-sectional data
often make such an implicit assumption, but some statistical controls
seem warranted if this study were to be extended. Not all firms have a
centralized R&D unit, but those that have such a unit conduct long-
termapplied researchthatofteninfluences thelevel andsuccessfulness of
divisional AR & D as reported in the FTC's file. (A case in point is the
research done at General Electric on synthetic industrial diamonds.)
Consequently, two firms could have the same level ofAR & D expendi-247 Firm versus Industry Variability in R&D Intensity
tures for comparable lines of business, but one could be significantly
more capable of nonprice competition because of previous research
conducted in its central R&D unit. Would firm dummy variables in-
dicating the presence of a central R&D unit control for this problem?
More germane to the actual empirical analysis is the issue of how
accurately 436 company and 19 two-digit dummy variables (see table
10.2) can controlfor differences in the value, costs, and opportunitiesfor
nonprice competition. Technological opportunities are clearly a difficult,
yetimportant, conceptto quantify. I suspect, however, thatthe company
dummies are controlling for many more things than intended. One sug-
gestion for future work might be to replace the company effects with a
single vectorofthe percentagesofcompany-financedR&D allocated to
basic research which can be calculated from the FTC file. Perhaps firms,
through their own profit calculus, engage in relatively more basic re-
search the fewer the direct opportunities for nonprice competition?
And, ofcourse, there is the issue ofsimultaneity betweenR&D (and
presumably AR & D) and concentration, which has already been dis-
cussed by Professors Levin and Reiss at this conference.
Company AR & D Expenditures and Government AR & D Financing
In section 10.3 of his paper, Professor Scott again imaginatively em-
ploys a fixed-effects model to test whether government AR & D spend-
ing is a substitute for, or a complement to, company-financed AR & D
expenditures. This is an important issue, and there is a paucity of evi-
dence related to it. Some speculations can be traced to the "pump
priming" versus "substitution" hypothesis of Blank and Stigler (1957).
Onthe one hand, new knowledge resulting from federal R&D enlarges
thefirm's scientificbase andthus expandstheopportunitiesfor additional
company-financed R&D. On the other hand, increases in federal
allocations may displace private investments if (1) the resulting R&D
output can be internalized by the firm, or if (2) federal obligations cause
the firm to reach its capacity for technical operations. Professor Scott's
finding (table 10.5) of a positive correlation between the two variables
leads him to conclude that government-financed AR & D does indeed
stimulate the level of company AR & D.
My comments here are similar to those directed to this issue in the first
section of Professor Scott's paper. To what extent do the results of
government-financed AR & D spill over to otherlines ofbusiness within
the firm and thus augment the efficiency of that AR & D? In other
words, does government-financed AR & D contracted to the company's
first line of business impact on company-financed AR & D in its second
line of business? Concomitantly, how mobile are R&D scientists be-
tween line of business activities? To what extent might they embody
AR & D related human capital?248 John T. Scott
My own work in this area, using firm level data, suggests that the
relationship between government-financed and company-financed
R&D (or even company productivity growth) is more subtle than
Professor Scott's analysis reveals (Higgins and Link 1981; Link 1981).
This subtlety can be detected by disaggregating R&D by category of
use. I have found that government-financed R&D not only augments
the level ofcompany-financedR&D, but also alters the composition of
that R&D. For example, a marginal dollar of government-financed
R&D increases the probability of a private dollar of R&D being
allocatedtoprocess-related, as opposedtoproduct-related,R&Dactiv-
ities. Also, some interesting results have been obtained by analyzing the
composition of government-financed R&D. For example, I have esti-
mated a negative relationship between company-financed basic research
and government-financed basic research expenditures while holding the
financing capabilities of the firm constant (Link 1982). Perhaps, then,
federal funds not only increase the level of corporate R&D but also
alter its relative composition as well.
I realize my comments raise questions that are beyond the scope ofthe
FTC'sline ofbusiness file. Still, these questions should be discussed ifwe
are to bettercomprehendthe robustness ofProfessorScott'sfindings and
if we are to model corporateR&D decisions more accurately in future
research.
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